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ABSTRACT 
Taxing Work:  Some Political and Economic Aspects of Labor Income 
Taxation* 
by Thomas R. Cusack and Pablo Beramendi 
This paper examines the development of tax regimes across the OECD 
countries in the latter part of the 20th century. It pays particular attention to 
taxes on labor income. A number of results emerge from this examination. First, 
not only do taxes on labor income represent a major drain on private 
households; they have become the mainstay of many of these countries’ public 
sector finances. Second, taxes on labor income, and not taxes on capital, 
appear to be the preferred instrument of finance for those economic and 
political interests that advocate and support a strong (and thereby expensive) 
welfare state. There is little “free lunch” to be had in these welfare states; if 
anything, “socialism in one class” seems to be the rule. Third, while the effort at 
financing the welfare state this way comes at cost in terms of loss in 
employment, the magnitude of such loss is inversely related to the degree of 
wage coordination in the labor market. 
 
Keywords:  Taxation, Partisan Politics, Institutions, Varieties of Capitalism 
JEL Classification:  H24, J32, J50, J64 
                                                 
*  This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association in Philadelphia and the European Consortium of Political Research Open 
Conference in Marburg. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and 
suggestions of Chris Anderson, William Clark, Rob Franzese, Steffen Ganghof, Bob 
Hancké, and Michael Wallerstein. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Besteuerung von Arbeit: Einige politische und ökonomische Aspekte von 
Steuern auf Arbeitseinkommen 
 
In diesem Beitrag wird die Entwicklung der Steuersysteme in OECD-Ländern 
über die letzten Jahrzehnte des 20. Jahrhunderts unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Steuern auf Arbeitseinkommen untersucht. Folgende 
Resultate können festgehalten werden. 
Erstens besteht nicht nur der Großteil der Abgabenbelastung für private 
Haushalte aus Steuern auf Arbeitseinkommen; sie sind vor allem der 
Grundstock der öffentlichen Finanzen in den betrachteten Ländern. Zweitens 
scheinen diese Steuern auf Arbeitseinkommen und nicht etwa 
Kapitalertragssteuern das bevorzugte Finanzierungsinstrument gerade der 
politischen und ökonomischen Interessenvertreter zu sein, die sich für einen 
starken und somit teuren Wohlfahrtsstaat aussprechen. Dabei existiert in den 
Wohlfahrtsstaaten kein sog. ‚free lunch’, vielmehr scheint der ‚Sozialismus in 
einer Gesellschaftsklasse’ an der Tagesordnung zu sein.  
Drittens lässt sich feststellen, dass diese Art der Finanzierung des 
Wohlfahrtsstaates Kosten in Form von Arbeitslosigkeit mit sich bringt, deren 
Höhe sich allerdings invers zum Grad der Koordination auf dem Arbeitsmarkt 
verhält. 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the last decades labor has carried an increasing burden 
of taxation in the post-industrial economies.  For example, Canadian 
workers paid about one-eight of their earnings in income taxes and social 
charges in 1965; by 1995 the extractions the Canadian government made 
from workers’ payroll checks had risen to a full third of their gross salaries 
and wages.1  In the Netherlands, growth in the direct tax burden on 
workers’ incomes also marked the period from the mid-sixties through the 
mid-nineties. But in the Dutch case, as with a fair number of other 
countries, these tax burdens were at significantly higher levels than those 
found in Canada. In the Netherlands, for example, the average worker saw 
the level of deductions from his or her income rise from one-third in 1965 
to one-half in 1995.  
 
What has been at work behind this development and what effect 
has it had on the labor market? These two questions, particularly the first, 
are the core concerns of this paper. In addressing these questions, we 
proceed as follows. Initially, we briefly discuss the problem of measuring 
the effective tax burden on labor and others inside the economy. We then 
demonstrate how, in general, the tax regimes of the OECD economies 
have changed from the mid-60s through the mid-90s. Second, we lay out 
an argument showing why taxes on labor income vary across countries 
and over time. We then proceed to assess the empirical strength of this 
argument. We do this by putting forward a specification of the argument, 
estimating the parameters of this model, and examining the implications of 
these parameter estimates. Finally, our focus shifts to examine the 
implications of this growth in the taxation of labor income for developments 
in the labor market. 
 
A number of results emerge from this preliminary effort at 
examining some of the political-economic aspects of labor taxation policy.  
First, not only do taxes on labor income represent a major drain on private 
households; they have become the mainstay of developed countries’ 
public sector finances. Second, taxes on labor income, and not taxes on 
capital, appear to be the preferred instrument of finance for those 
economic and political interests that advocate and support a strong (and 
thereby expensive) welfare state. Third, while the effort at financing the 
welfare state this way comes at cost in terms of loss in employment, the 
magnitude of such loss is inversely related to the degree of wage 
coordination in the labor market.  
                                                 
1 The tax rates used in this paragraph are based Mendoza, et als’ (1994) measure of the 
average effective tax rate on the income of employed workers. Some details on this 
measure are provided in the next section. 
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Tax Structures in the OECD 
In recent times both scholars and international institutions have 
made efforts to quantify taxation policies. A number have done this by 
constructing different measures of Average Effective Tax Rates (AETRs).2 
There is an advantage to these tax rates relative to more traditional 
indicators (e.g., revenues obtained from a particular source of income 
expressed as a percentage of GDP). This advantage is that they are better 
(but admittedly imperfect) indicators of tax policy with respect to different 
and specific kinds of income and other economic stocks and flows than 
measures that compute the ratio of a tax category to gross domestic 
product. 
 
A particular controversy has arisen on the question of the relative 
levels of taxation on capital and labor and the consequences these have 
for the economy. The OECD in particular has been concerned with this 
issue and has been in the lead on charging that capital has been 
overtaxed relative to labor. In order to compute labor and capital AETRs, it 
is first necessary to calculate the overall average tax rate on household 
income. In the case of the Mendoza, et al formulation used here this 
variable is equal to taxes on income, profits, and capital gains of 
individuals expressed as a percentage of gross income.3 The latter is 
defined as the sum of unincorporated business net income, household 
income, dividends and investment receipts, and compensation of 
employees less employers’ social security contributions and employers’ 
contributions to private pension plans. With this rate and with a wage 
variable, which is equal to compensation of employees less employer 
contributions to public social insurance and private pension schemes, one 
can compute the average effective tax rate on labor. 
 
The average effective tax rate on capital based on the Mendoza, et 
al version used here draws on unincorporated business net income, 
household income, dividends and investment receipts, corporate taxes on 
income, profits and capital gains of individuals, recurrent taxes on 
immovable property, taxes on financial and capital transactions, and the 
overall economy’s operating surplus. 
 
The OECD variants differ from the Mendoza, et al AETR measures 
on labor and capital in a number of ways. These reflect concerns such as 
distributing the reported unallocable social security contributions between 
employers and employees, imputing income shares for employees as well 
                                                 
2 Eurostat reports an extensive set of annual statistics on AETRs for European Union 
member countries as well as Japan and the United States (see e.g., Eurostat, 2000 and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2000). The OECD has produced two reports criticizing the earlier work 
of Mendoza et al (1994). The first major OECD study was by Carey and Tchilinguirian 
(2000) that challenged the work by Mendoza, et al (1994) and produced new AETR’s that 
reflected the OECD position that Mendoza, et al’s measures understated the tax burden 
borne by capital and correspondingly overstated the burden borne by labor. The second 
major OECD study, that by Volkerink and deHaan, criticized both the Mendoza et al 
measures and those put forward in the Carey and Tchilinguirian report. 
3 The definitions for all the AETR variables used in this paper can be found in Volkerink 
and deHaan (2001). 
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as self-employed and non-employed, etc.4 The results obtained from these 
calculations have the potential to vary considerably.  
 
Figure 1 displays three different versions of the AETR on labor, 
namely the Mendoza, et al version and the two OECD variants. However, 
at the level of aggregation used in the figure, i.e., OECD wide-averages, 
there turns out to be only one detectable difference among the three 
versions and this is simply the level of the AETRs and not their time 
trajectories. The Mendoza, et al measure is larger than the OECD 
variants. All of the measures rose almost unabatedly through the three-
decade period under observation. The cross-country average using the 
Mendoza et al measure grew from 24.1 percent in 1965 to 39.5 percent in 
1995.  For the two OECD labor income AETRs, the corresponding figures 
are 22.1 percent in 1965 to 36.1 percent in 1995 and 21.5 percent in 1965 
to 35.6 percent in 1995. 
 
Along with the upward trajectory of the labor income AETRs, a 
common tendency during this three-decade period was for the alternative 
labor tax bases to increase initially and then to fall back to levels near 
where they started. Figure 2 below displays the evolution of the three tax 
bases as a share of GDP between 1965 and the late 1990s.  As 
mentioned above, the compositions of the different tax bases used in 
calculating these AETRs vary. These variations are reflected in the tax 
revenues measured as shares of GDP. On average, Mendoza, et al’s 
measure uses the smallest base. Again, the three series have followed 
similar time trajectories.  All expanded in relative terms through to the late 
1970s and then reversed direction generally returning to levels close to 
those that prevailed in the mid-60s. 
 
These two developments, the relentless growth in the average 
effective tax rate and the growth and then decline in the base against 
which these tax rates are applied have helped create the situation where 
labor income has come to provide a much larger share of the total 
resources the public sector extracts from the economy. For example, 
using the Mendoza et al measure, whereas in 1965 11.5 percent of GDP 
was taken in form of taxation on labor income by the state, that level had 
risen to nearly 20 percent in 1995. Even higher levels are to been seen in 
the two OECD series on labor AETRs.  In one, the share of GDP going to 
the state in the form of taxation on labor income rose from about 12 to 
approximately 21 percent in the period from 1965 to 1995. Using the other 
OECD measure, this share grew from about 15 percent to nearly 24 
percent of GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The formulae used for calculating the OECD AETRs can be found in the Carey and 
Tchilinguirian (2000) paper or in Volkerink and deHaan (2001). 
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Figure 1 
Average Effective Tax Rates on Labor Income:
Cross-Country Averages, 1965-95
Year
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Figure 2 
Relative Sizes of Labor Income Tax Bases:
Cross-Country Averages, 1965-95
Year
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Figure 3 
Tax on Labor Income as a Percent of Total Tax Revenues
Cross-Country Annual Averages
Year
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Table 1 
National Tax Regimes in Liberal and Coordinated 
Market Economies, 1965 and 1995 
Average Effective Tax Rates on Consumption, Labor Income, Capital Income and Corporate Profits: 
Mendoza, et al and OECD (version 2) 
 
  Mend.     OECD    
 YEAR Cons. Lab. Cap. Corp.  Cons. Lab. Cap. Corp. 
LME Average 1965 10.4 15.4 35.3 27.4  10.9 14.4 45.8 36.5 
 1995 10.9 26.5 44.8 31.7  10.5 23.9 56.6 49.0 
CME Average 1965 14.6 27.5 19.1 24.0  13.2 24.6 28.8 29.6 
 1995 17.9 44.7 32.2 26.1  13.5 40.2 42.9 30.4 
           
Indiv. LMEs           
United States 1965 6.4 15.4 36.8 30.4  6.5 14.0 47.1 46.3 
 1995 5.6 26.6 41.1 24.2  5.7 22.5 49.0 39.3 
Canada 1965 13.0 12.2 36.0 28.7  14.3 11.5 50.1 29.0 
 1995 12.2 32.8 47.2 20.1  11.5 29.8 56.3 24.0 
UK 1965 13.3 21.5 36.9 12.2  12.5 20.1 43.1 29.5 
 1995 16.9 24.8 46.8 41.2  15.0 22.0 63.3 65.4 
Australia 1965 8.7 12.4 31.3 38.2  10.3 12.2 43.0 41.2 
 1995 8.8 21.7 44.2 41.3  10.0 21.1 58.0 67.3 
           
Indiv. CMEs           
Netherlands 1965 --- 33.7 22.2 18.6  12.7 28.5 27.1 18.6 
 1995 18.2 50.6 28.1 21.8  16.0 40.8 37.8 21.8 
Belgium 1965 --- 28.7 17.5 17.0  15.0 24.4 21.3 17.0 
 1995 16.6 47.1 36.2 29.4  15.0 39.3 44.6 29.5 
France 1965 22.4 34.4 15.9 38.9  18.1 26.8 23.7 72.3 
 1995 19.9 47.2 27.9 27.7  15.5 40.8 35.4 44.5 
Switzerland 1965 5.7 19.3 14.4 12.0  5.9 --- --- 15.6 
 1995 --- 34.5 31.8 23.7  7.8 31.1 49.5 29.4 
Germany 1965 15.9 29.3 20.7 9.0  14.6 26.4 23.3 12.1 
 1995 16.7 42.7 25.0 5.1  14.1 38.1 30.1 7.6 
Austria 1965 17.9 35.3 14.8 5.6  13.9 38.5 22.0 8.2 
 1995 19.0 48.0 22.4 7.4  14.2 57.0 45.6 9.8 
Italy 1965 12.4 24.3 12.8 48.2  13.7 14.9 42.6 48.2 
 1995 15.7 47.1 32.6 51.4  14.1 36.5 41.1 58.2 
Finland 1965 17.1 22.3 22.5 31.8  16.8 19.0 37.1 44.8 
 1995 26.1 49.8 32.1 15.3  17.3 46.5 33.5 18.0 
Sweden 1965 16.4 32.7 30.0 24.7  14.5 30.6 32.3 24.8 
 1995 22.5 52.5 41.4 27.7  15.0 47.9 45.5 33.6 
Japan 1965 5.7 15.1 20.4 33.9  7.0 12.3 30.0 33.9 
 1995 6.0 27.7 44.3 51.3  6.2 24.1 66.6 51.3 
 
--- Data not available. 
-- Corporate income AETR in right-hand panel based on Volkerink and deHaan’s definition. All other 
OECD AETR’s are based on Carey and Tchilinguirian’s formulations.  
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As a consequence of these developments, the tax regimes of the 
OECD countries have come to rely extensively on labor income. By the 
end of the 1970s taxes on such income amounted to approximately 50 
percent of all tax revenue garnered by the public sector (see Figure 3). 
Note, however, that there are important differences across these countries 
in terms of the structures of their tax regimes (see Table 1). For example, 
among the group of nations considered to have Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs), there is a clear tendency to avoid heavy taxation on consumption 
and labor and to rely to greater extent on capital for tax receipts.5 And 
while labor income has come increasingly under taxation within this group 
of countries, the rates are nowhere near as high as those found within 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMES). These latter countries are also 
particularly heavy-handed in terms of their extractions on consumption 
outlays while being much lighter of touch than Liberal Market Economies 
in the taxes they extract from capital. 
 
This tendency for Coordinated Market Economies to tax labor more 
heavily than capital appears to be a fairly consistent pattern across the tax 
regimes of the OECD countries. Rather clear evidence on this is given in 
Figure 4 and Table 2 where we report the results from a series of cross-
sectional analyses showing the relationship between the level of 
coordination within an economy and the ratio of the average effective tax 
rates on labor and capital.6 These results bring out the point clearly that 
CMEs have tax regimes that place higher average effective tax rates on 
labor than on capital, while LMEs do the opposite.7 
 
We know that CMEs also tend to have larger and more generous 
welfare states than Liberal Market Economies (Estevez-Abe, et al. 2001). 
In turn, then, it would appear to be the case that CMEs are financing their 
generous redistributive programs mainly by taxing the recipients of those 
programs rather than taxing recipients of other income sources. This point 
is clearly conveyed by Figure 5, where the relation between labor taxation 
(Mendoza) as a percentage of GDP and the share of GDP that 
governments transfer to households is displayed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies are terms used in the 
Varieties of Capitalism Approach developed by Hall and Soskice (2001). 
6 The coordination measure is based on Hall and Gingerich’s (2001) index. 
7 Similar results have been found using the two alternative OECDs sets of labor and 
capital AETRs. 
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Figure 4 
Coordinated Market Economies and the
Propensity to Tax Labor Income
(Mendoza vers.) Average 1965-69
Economic Coordination (Hall and Gingerich)
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Table 2 
 
Ratios of Labor to Capital AETRs as a Function of the  
Degree of Economic Coordination 
OLS Estimates of Five-Year Averages 
 Constant Coordination 2R  
Mendoza et al    
1965-69 .26 
(.25) 
1.70 
(.39) 
.62 
1970-74 .23 
(.25) 
1.72 
(.38) 
.63 
1975-79 .34 
(.20) 
1.31 
(.29) 
.61 
1980-84 .40 
(.29) 
1.08 
(.28) 
.52 
1985-89 .41 
(.20) 
1.11 
(.30) 
.49 
1990-94 .40 
(.18) 
1.18 
(.27) 
.57 
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This relationship between taxes on labor and transfers to 
households is puzzling. In general, the presence of social-democratic 
parties in power is more likely in a CME than it is in an LME. In this 
context, one would think that redistribution involves not only a progressive 
income tax, but also, particularly from a social-democratic perspective, an 
effort to make transfers between income classes (labor and capital). And 
yet CMEs consistently finance their social protection systems by taxing 
mainly labor. This puzzling situation prompts the following question: why is 
it that CMEs are far ahead of LMEs in taxing labor income as opposed to 
other sources of revenues? 
Figure 5 
Government Transfers and Labor Tax Receipts (Mendoza)
(14 countries, 6 five year averages)
Government Transfers to Households as % GDP
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Setting Tax Policy 
Our answer to this question is that welfare policy within the OECD 
countries is principally a matter of redistribution within one class. One of 
the main policy instruments used to achieve this is taxation on labor 
income. In this section we outline the forces at work in shaping this policy 
and pay particular attention to specific institutional features of the 
economic and political systems and how they contribute to the creation 
and maintenance of this policy.  
 
A central feature of the organization of the economy is the degree 
of wage coordination between capital and labor. Indeed, this is 
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conventionally regarded as a crucial aspect of the difference between 
Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). Let 
us consider briefly the nature of such differences and their implications for 
labor income tax policies. 
 
LMEs rely heavily on markets as the main mechanism to allocate 
resources. In LMEs firms coordinate their activities via competitive market 
arrangements. Relations between capital and labor are organized by 
individuals and not by associations. Capitalists value their capacity to 
adjust to market fluctuations; and so too does labor by investing in 
portable, general skills. Neither has an incentive to coordinate outside the 
market. 
 
Alternatively, markets are organized very differently in CMEs. Firms 
find incentives to coordinate with unions and the government around a 
fundamental “non-market based” equilibrium between capital and labor. 
An equilibrium such as this becomes politically effective via the wage 
coordination compromise between capital, labor and the government. 
 
By virtue of this compromise labor agrees to restrain wage 
demands, thereby contributing to lower inflation and better economic 
conditions, but most importantly for itself, gains a degree of income 
insurance for workers. 8 Government uses fiscal policy to compensate 
labor for its sacrifice and thereby reduces the costs of the compromise.  It 
does this through a large welfare state that provides labor with an 
insurance system that guarantees both a good income level in periods of 
economic downturns and longer-term earnings (pensions). In addition, 
labor unions obtain the capacity to ensure an egalitarian wage distribution 
and the political control over the implementation of a large number of 
public policies (Coe and Snower 1997; Swenson and Pontusson 2000). 
 
Coordination is beneficial for employers because it avoids the 
disruption in production associated with industrial disputes. In addition, the 
welfare state is also functional from the perspective of capitalists in that it 
contributes to the maintenance of a labor force with specific skills (Iversen 
and Soskice 2001). Finally, the employer’s share of the compromise is to 
accept solidaristic wage policies and a large welfare state. In short, high 
levels of wage coordination imply that, in exchange for the wage 
moderation on the part of labor, capitalists accept that the government 
(together with the unions) develops a large, very costly, public insurance 
system. 
 
Because of the compromises involved in wage coordination, 
governments of CMEs, as opposed to those of LMEs, devote a larger 
share of their GDP to social transfers and public services (Estevez-Abe et 
al., 2001).  As a result, governments in CMEs need to raise a larger 
amount of public revenues. This brings us to the relationship between the 
organization of economic institutions and the design of taxation structures. 
The question is who is going to bear the cost of the highly developed 
                                                 
8 For a detailed characterization of the nature of this compromise see Cameron (1984), 
Regini (1984), Wallerstein, Golden and Lange (1997) and Wallerstein and Golden (2000). 
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welfare states at work in CMEs.  Our discussion in the previous section of 
the general patterns of taxation in OECD countries suggests that the 
answer to this question is mainly labor as opposed to capital.  There are 
two reasons why this is the case.  
 
First, governments tax labor more than capital because taxing the 
latter has become increasingly difficult over time. The exits available to 
capital have grown in the modern era, thereby making it ever more difficult 
for government to tap this source of income  (Genschel 2002 and Ganghof 
2003).  Such has not been the case for labor. Mobility of this factor of 
production has been and remains quite limited.  
 
The second reason relates to wage coordination and the 
differences between CMEs and LMEs. It concerns the potential impact 
that different tax structures could have on the incentives of capital to 
maintain wage coordination with labor and, ultimately, to endorse the 
development of the welfare state. Simply put, if a tax structure were to 
place the cost of the welfare state on the shoulders of capital, it would 
eliminate the incentives for capitalists to coordinate with labor. High taxes 
on capital reduce firm owners’ net profits, harming investment and, in the 
long run, lowering economic growth. In such a case, the reduction in their 
net income would outweigh the benefits they obtain from coordinated 
wage bargaining. 
 
These two points clarify why the cost of the welfare state must be 
carried principally by labor. But for labor this is a necessary evil. Getting 
the benefits provided by a generous welfare state only comes at the price 
of paying its cost. This trade-off is one of the hallmarks of a Coordinated 
Market Economy.  
 
The constraints on capital income taxation and the opportunity 
costs they impose are also relevant to an understanding of the role of 
partisanship in shaping the variation in tax policies of OECD countries. 
Political parties at different ends of the ideological spectrum promote the 
interests of different groups of supporters and hold opposed views as to 
what the desirable level of redistribution should be. 
 
Since the contributions of Hibbs (1977, 1987) and Kirschen, et al 
(1964), scholars endorsing the partisanship approach to public policy have 
argued that social democratic and other left-wing parties tend to promote 
the interest of labor, while conservative parties tend to promote the 
interests of “upscale” groups. Generally, promoting the interests of labor is 
understood as taxing and spending more, whereas advancing the interests 
of upscale groups is seen as taxing and spending less. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect a good deal of the variation in public policy outcomes 
to be the result of the ideological profile of the parties in control of 
government. For example, Esping-Andersen (1985) provided a detailed 
analysis of how Scandinavian social democrats used the welfare state to 
forge stable electoral coalitions leading them to, and keeping them, in 
power. In addition, many other students of comparative political economy 
have produced a great deal of evidence supporting the claim that left- 
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(right-) wing parties provide higher (lower) levels of redistribution. (Hibbs 
1992, Franzese 2002, and Bartels, 2003).  
 
The general evidence on the effects of partisanship is difficult to 
dispute.9 Nevertheless, the existence of the above-mentioned trade-off 
between redistribution within labor and redistribution between income 
classes qualifies our understanding of the relationship between 
partisanship and redistribution in the following sense. A large welfare state 
is only viable under the condition that capital not be taxed too heavily.  
Thus, greater redistribution by left-wing governments should lead to higher 
levels of taxation on labor.  
 
Simply put, left-wing governments cannot promote the interests of 
labor by financing generous transfers with taxes on capital income. 
Rather, the policy choice is about the promotion of the interests of different 
types of workers.  By choosing to combine very generous transfer policies 
with high levels of labor income taxation, left-wing governments stand for 
the interests of the lower part of the wage distribution. In contrast, by 
choosing a strategy based on reduced levels of generosity and lower tax 
rates on labor, right wing governments promote the interests of high wage 
and salary earners, those who would bear the greatest costs under 
progressive income tax schemes. Provided one or another party is in 
office for a sufficiently long period, these two different strategies should 
become sharply reflected in the taxation policies of OECD governments.10 
 
Nonetheless, the clarity of the reflection is contingent upon specific 
aspects of the design of political institutions.11 Some of these institutions 
facilitate the unencumbered translation of ideological preferences into 
policy outcomes. Other institutional settings have both incentives and 
constraints that moderate or mute this translation. The rich literature on 
veto players and veto points is an illustration of this general proposition. 
For example, Tsebelis´ (1995) theory of veto players points out how the 
presence of such actors militates against significant policy change. Huber, 
Ragin and Stephens (1993) and Huber and Stephens (2001) produce 
evidence that the number of institutional veto points12 existing in a country 
has a constraining effect on the levels of welfare effort. More qualitatively, 
Immergut (1992) shows how health policy outcomes in France, 
Switzerland and Sweden were affected by the structure of legislative veto 
points existing in these countries. 
 
All these contributions suggest that the translation of party 
platforms into public policies is far from automatic. While partisan 
                                                 
9 For a dissenting and critical view, see Blais, et al, 1993 and Imbeau, et al, 2001. 
10 For an insightful analysis of how political instititutions influence the shape of taxation 
systems, see Steinmo (1993). It should be pointed out that the results reported in Boix 
(1999), Swank and Steinmo (2002) and Bretscher and Hettich (2002) are not fully 
consistent in showing how partisanship influences tax policy. 
11 See Schmidt 1996, 2002. 
12 These include federalism, parliamentary/presidential government, proportional 
representation/single member districts, bicameralism, and the possibility to call referenda 
(Huber, Ragin and Stephens (1993: 728). In addition, see Schmidt (2000, 2002), Obinger 
and Kittel (2003), and Cusack and Fuchs (2003).  
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differences exist, the size of these differences in terms of public policy is 
likely to depend on the pattern of executive-legislature relations and in 
particular, the relative power of these two institutions in the setting of 
public policy. 
 
 
Ultimately, the relative power depends upon the electoral system in 
use. For a variety of reasons (Lijphart 1999), strong executives seem to 
emerge in those political systems that use majoritarian voting rules. 
Likewise, weak executives (and, correspondingly, strong legislatures) 
have emerged in political systems that rely on proportional representation. 
How does this difference shape partisan effects on tax policy? 
 
Assuming that majoritarian electoral systems simplify elections to a 
competition between two major alternatives (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997) 
and that preferences about taxation can be subsumed in a single 
dimension, then the median voter theorem applies. In order to win the 
election, parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum must articulate 
their platforms and policies13 around the position of the median voter. As a 
result the scope for partisan differences in majoritarian electoral systems is 
constrained by the nature of political competition. Therefore, one would 
see modest differences between left and right policies.  
 
Electoral systems based on proportional representation (PR) shape 
political competition in exactly the opposite direction. In contrast to 
majoritarian systems, policy outcomes are expected to reflect positions 
further away from the median voter on either side of the ideological 
spectrum. As a result, the partisan effects on policy outcomes will be 
sharper.  
 
In order to lend some substance to this claim we make use of a 
simplified version of the model developed by Austen-Smith and Banks 
(1988). Consider a legislature with three parties (PK). Subscript K defines 
the ideological position of the parties (K={L, C, R}), where subscripts L, C 
and R stand, respectively, for left, center and right. Each party has a 
weight (WK) that represents the share of seats in the legislature. Thus the 
weighted ideological profile of the legislature is given by ∑ KK WP * .14  
 
The process of government formation is driven by parties’ positions 
on a single dimension, namely taxation policy. How do they bargain and 
what is the likely policy outcome?  To answer this question it is necessary 
to introduce a number of additional assumptions. First, parties have perfect 
information. Second, the sequence of the game between the parties in the 
legislature is as follows. In the first stage of the game, t=1, the party with 
the largest number of seats proposes a coalition to another party. The 
proposal may be accepted or rejected. If the proposal is rejected, then, at 
                                                 
13 The claim that  policies reflect platforms is based on the assumption of retrospective 
voting.  
14 Note that the measure of ideological center of gravity used in the empirical analysis 
below is formulated in the same way. 
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t=2, the party with the second highest number of seats has the initiative. It 
proposes a different coalition. If this proposal is rejected by its recipient, 
the party with the lowest weight gets to propose at t=3. At this stage if the 
parties cannot reach an agreement, a “special” government is formed such 
that the payoff for the three parties is 0. Figure 6 provides a graphic 
representation of the bargaining process. In addtion, we take as given the 
result proved by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988: 416-417) that in PR 
systems the party adopting the position of the median voter (P c ) is the one 
that receives the lowest number of votes. 
 
Each party’s strategy consists of two elements: a proposal and a 
response to others proposals. The proposal (φK) contains three elements, 
namely, a proposed set of coalition parties (C), a policy position (pK) and a 
(proposed) distribution of portfolios (gK) within the coalition. The second 
element of the strategy is set of responses to others’ proposals (rKÆ{0,1}, 
where 0 means rejection and 1 acceptance). 
 
The selection of a particular strategy is driven by two 
considerations, the utility and the opportunity costs attached to proposals 
and responses. The utility of any given proposal is a function of its policy 
position (pK) and its distribution of portfolios (gK). The opportunity costs are 
defined as the payoffs that would have been obtained had the party 
chosen differently. For instance, the opportunity cost of a party accepting a 
proposal at t=2 is the payoff that this party would have obtained from the 
outcome implemented at t=3. In sum, the opportunity costs depend on the 
responses of parties to the proposals made at each stage. Let α(φ) Æ {0,1} 
represent the product of party responses to any given proposal φ at stages 
1-3 in the model.  
 
More formally, the utility function of any given party PK is defined 
as:  
 
UK(φK)=  UK(pK, gK)*α( φK)                                                                (1) 
 
where the functional form of UK is set by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) 
to be quasi-linear on g and quadratic on the differences between the 
expected policy outcome (y) and the preferred policy position of each 
party: 
 
UK(pK, gK)= gK  - (y- pK)2                                                                   (2) 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
The Sequence of the Bargaining Process (W1>W2>W3) 
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Subsequently, the opportunity costs at the different stages (OC(s)) 
of the game are defined as: 
 
OC(3)K(φK, r)=  0  (by assumption) 
 
OC(2)K(φK, r)=  α3(φK)*UK(p3, g3)                                                   (3) 
 
OC(1)K(φK, r)=    α2(φK)*UK(p2, g2) +(1-α2(φK))* OC(2)K 
 
The interaction between the parties is modeled as a legislative 
bargaining game with perfect information. In this context, a coalition will be 
in equilibrium if there is a proposal (φ*) that maximizes the utility of the 
proponent party and a response by the joining party (α*=1) that maximizes 
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the latter’s utility.15 For the purposes of our argument, the key aspect of 
this model is the nature of the policy outcome of the bargaining solution. 
By establishing the characteristics of the policy that satisfies the 
equilibrium condition, the model highlights how political competition in PR 
systems reinforces partisan effects while dampening those effects in 
majoritarian systems. 
 
Let us illustrate the nature of policy outcomes with two examples. 
First, consider the case in which no party holds the majority (WL, WC, WR < 
1/2) and the ranking of voting shares is WL>WR>WC (recall that, by 
assumption, the ranking of seats shares would be either WR>WL>WC or 
WL>WR>WC). At time t=1 PL offers a coalition proposal to PC. He does not 
offer it to PR because it anticipates its negative response. Given that at 
time=2 it is PR who gets to propose, the opportunity cost of accepting a 
proposal at time=1 is very high (see expression 3-OC(1) above), which in 
turns implies that, in order to gain PR’s acceptance, PL would have to 
make such concessions that the coalition outcomes would no longer be 
optimal. Thus PL chooses y and gL to maximize its own utility and the 
chances of getting a positive response from PC.  More formally, making 
use of xpression (2) above, PL’ s chooses y and gL to maximize the joint 
utility of the proposed coalition partners: 
 
 
Max gL – (y-pL)2 + (G-gL-(y-pC)2)                                                            (4) 
 
where G stands for the total number of portfolios in the coalition. Solving 
this problem, the coalition policy outcome required to obtain an equilibrium 
is such that 
 
y*= (pL+pC)/2                                                                                          (5) 
 
which implies that the taxation policy implemented by this coalition 
government would be in between the preferred policy positions of the left-
wing party and the party representing the position of the median voter. 16 
 
A second example can be seen in the situation where one party 
holds the majority in the legislature  (Wk>1/2), no bargaining between 
parties occurs. Under such circumstances, the policy outcome will reflect 
the policy position that maximizes the utility of the members of the winning 
party (y*=pK*), which, in turn, corresponds to that of the median legislator 
within the winning party. Regardless of the side of the ideological 
spectrum being considered, this position would always be further away 
from the median than in majoritarian systems. 
 
                                                 
15 Formally, these two conditions require that  (1)  UK(φ*K) > OC(s)K(φ*K, r) and (2)  α*(CK, 
pK, gK)=1 if   UK(φ*K) ≥ OC(s)K(φ*K, r). Condition (2) implies that the proposal made by the 
party must be Pareto-efficient (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988: 422). 
16 A symmetrical result would be obtained if the ranking shares of parties were 
WR>WL>WC.  
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In conclusion, the model shows that whereas in majoritarian 
systems public policy will be oriented towards satisfying the median voter, 
in PR systems policy will appeal to the median supporter of  the winning 
coalition, who need not be the median voter. In the latter case partisan 
preferences are more clearly reflected in policy outcomes. What does this 
imply? We should expect that where strong executives exist, the partisan 
effects on policy outcomes are muted. As a consequence, one would see 
modest differences between left and right policies. On the other hand, 
partisan preferences will be given fuller rein in systems where the 
legislature is dominant and the executive weak. Tax policy will more fully 
reflect the partisan preferences of the dominant parties in the legislature 
and not in the electorate.  
 
To sum up, our analysis of the determinants of labor income tax 
policy has pointed out a fundamental trade-off: large levels of redistribution 
on the expenditure side need to be funded mainly by taxing labor income. 
By implication, those factors conventionally associated with larger levels of 
redistribution should be found positively associated with higher tax rates 
on labor. More specifically, the following testable propositions can be 
derived from our argument: 
 
• A high level of wage coordination is expected to be positively and 
significantly associated with higher tax rates on labor. 
 
• Left-wing governments are expected to be positively and 
significantly associated with higher taxes on labor. Alternatively, 
right-wing governments are expected to produce lower taxes on 
labor. 
 
• The magnitudes of these partisan differences are expected to be 
larger in political institutional settings where the legislature is 
dominant and the executive weak. 
 
Later in this section we provide an empirical test of these three 
propositions, but first allow us to specify the control variables in our 
analysis and say something about the data and design used here. 
 
In addition to the variables considered in the main part of our 
argument, the empirical specification of the determinants of average 
effective tax rates include a number of controls. First, we include the level 
of electoral participation. We hypothesize this variable to be negatively 
related to the average effective tax rate on labor income. The general line 
of argument here is that higher levels of electoral participation bring in 
more voters who are averse to high tax rates on labor. This in turn signals 
to politicians the increased electoral unpopularity of such policy and 
should result in lower tax rates on labor.  
 
The general point can be seen by considering those that normally 
vote and those that do not. For example, one group with high rates of 
electoral participation is the very rich. These people are happy to support 
high labor tax rates. Such are likely to lower their own tax rates. High-
 18 
income earners also can be expected to support higher tax rates on labor 
since they themselves have both the resources and the incentives to 
legally use the complexities of the tax system to avoid being taxed. They, 
too, normally vote. The unemployed and retired are net recipients of 
transfers. It is in their interest to support high taxes on labor since this 
leads to higher income for them. Certainly the latter group, which is very 
large and is known for its widespread electoral participation, would support 
higher taxes on labor income source as long as the transfers they receive 
increase. On the other hand, medium- and low-income earners have good 
reason to be averse to higher labor income tax rates in that earnings from 
labor represent their only income source and an increase in this rate 
implies a greater loss. It is this group of voters who are likely to be 
fluctuating between participation and non-participation. Movement in the 
direction of the first option would increase the level of voter resistance to 
taxation on labor while movement in the other direction would lower that 
resistance. 
 
Next we need to take into account the effects produced by the 
generosity of welfare programs. The budget constraint on governments 
implies that, other things being equal, an increase in the levels of 
generosity of welfare programs (be it in the form of the rate of transfers or 
the eligibility for recipient status) must have a positive and significant 
impact on the levels of revenues extracted. Since labor income has been 
shown to be the main source of revenues for OECD governments during 
the period of interest, an increase in the levels of generosity is expected to 
be associated with an increase in the levels of average effective tax rates 
on labor. 
 
Finally, we consider variation in the size of the demographic 
burden. The effect on the level of the average effective tax rate on labor 
income of this variable is expected to be positive. The higher the share of 
the population dependent on the state, the greater is the need for the latter 
to extract revenues from the economy. As in the case of generosity, this 
requirement to extract further revenues is expected to lead to an increase 
in the average effective tax rates on labor. 
 
In an effort to evaluate the empirical utility of these ideas, we have 
specified a panel regression equation and estimated that equation using 
data on 14 OECD countries for six five-year periods.17 The equation takes 
the following form: 
 
ititititititit EPLEGLCOGLEGLCOGCCOGLTR 54321 * βββββα +++++=  
itititit GENDBWC εβββ ++++ 876  
 
                                                 
17 The equation has been estimated three times, once using the Mendoza tax rates and 
then with the two variants from the OECD. Note that missing data problems for one of the 
OECD variants reduced the number of countries to thirteen. The fourteen countries 
included in the first two estimation efforts include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Switzerland is the country for which it was not possible 
to estimate the equation for the second of the OECD variants. 
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Table 3 below provides the definitions for the variables specified in the 
equation. 
 
Estimation results for this equation using OLS with panel corrected 
standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995, 1996) are reported in Table 4. The 
estimated effects are similar across the three different data series used 
and so we focus our attention on the results reported in the first column. In 
general, the fit of the equation to the data appears satisfactory in all three 
instances. One problem, however, shows up in the two OECD series that 
is not evident in the case of the Mendoza data series; namely, there is 
some evidence, using the Lagrange multiplier test, of autocorrelated error. 
 
With the Mendoza data as with the OECD series we see that all of 
the parameters for the control variables take on the signs expected of 
them and are statistically significant. Thus, both the prevailing level of 
generosity of the welfare state, as well as the relative size of an important 
part of the welfare state’s clientele, have the predicted positive impacts on 
the level of the average effective tax rate on labor income. In addition, the 
anticipated negative effect of widespread electoral participation is 
registered. The higher the level of electoral participation, the lower the rate 
of taxation on labor income.  
 
The impact of wage coordination on labor tax rates is positive (and 
statistically significant) as predicted. Thus, industrial relations systems with 
structural features that allow or promote highly coordinated wage 
bargaining will be marked by far higher tax rates on labor income than 
those systems where little or no such features exist. Given the parameter 
estimate (in column 1), a system with centralized bargaining by peak 
confederations would likely have an average effective tax rate on labor 
income approximately eight percentage points higher than a system with 
fragmented wage bargaining confined to individual firms or plants, all else 
being equal. 
 
Examining the estimated parameters on the individual partisan and 
institutional variables in the model allows one to build up a picture of the 
degree to which partisanship affects tax policy and how the institutional 
context mutes or amplifies this effect. First, let us examine the effects of 
partisanship. We have a partisan term describing the cabinet and one 
describing the legislature.  The parameter on the cabinet term is positive 
and statistically significant. Given the measure being used for the partisan 
character of the cabinet, this parameter implies that leftist governments 
have policies that entail higher levels of average effective tax rates on 
labor income as predicted. On the other hand, the parameter on the 
partisan character of the legislature turns out to be negative, although 
statistically insignificant. 
 
This seemingly contradictory indication that leftist legislatures follow 
policies of lower taxation on labor needs to be seen in light of the fact that 
the effect of the partisan character of the legislature is contingent on the 
relative institutional strength of the legislature. This latter impact is 
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captured by the parameter on the interaction between the strength of the 
legislature and the partisan measure. The parameter on the constituent 
term, Legislative Center of Political Gravity, only has meaning in the 
situation where Legislative Institutional Dominance is zero (i.e., where the 
executive is completely dominant), and then its effects are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
 
The parameter for the other constituent term in the interaction, 
namely, the coefficient on Legislative Institutional Dominance variable, is 
negative and clearly statistically significant. This points to the conclusion 
that when the partisan orientation of the legislature is on the far right then 
the effect on tax policy is to sharply lower the level of the average effective 
tax rate on labor income by an amount that is contingent on the degree of 
legislative dominance. 
 
At the same time, the parameter for the interaction between the 
legislative partisanship and legislative institutional term brings out the 
amplifying effect of a legislature that is both leftist and strong vis-à-vis the 
executive. This can be illustrated by drawing on a few examples of the 
model’s predictions under a number of conditions where the cabinet and 
the legislature are unified or divided in terms of partisanship. 
 
The first panel of Table 5 (panel a) provides examples where the 
cabinet and legislature have common ideological orientations. On the left 
hand side of the panel we see the effects of partisanship where the 
executive is weak. Here there is a gaping contrast between a unified 
government of the left and one of the right. In contrast to rightist 
governments, leftist governments follow a policy that taxes labor income 
heavily. On the right hand side of the panel, which illustrates the effects of 
partisanship where government is unified but the executive is strong, one 
sees that while leftist governments continue to tax labor income more 
heavily than rightist governments, the contrast between the left and the 
right is much reduced. 
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Table 3 
Variables in Model Predicting Average Effective Tax Rate on Labor Income 
Variable Label Variable definition. 
itLTR  Average effective rate of taxation on labor income, period average. Three variants from Mendoza, et al and the OECD. Data used for construction of 
these series derive from the OECD’s National Accounts of OECD Countries, 
Detailed Tables, Volume II, various annual issues. 
itCCOG  Cabinet center of political gravity, average for period. This is a weighted measure of political orientation of the governing coalition’s ideology using the 
Castle-Mair codings of parties’ positions on a left-right scale. The data for this 
and the LCOG variable are described in Cusack (1997) and available at the 
following web site: <http://www.wz-berlin.de/mp/ism/staff/cusack_data_sets. 
en.htm#data> 
itLCOG  Legislative center of political gravity, average for period. Similar to the cabinet measure but based on the parties within the legislature. 
iLEG  The extent to which parliament dominates the executive: based on Lijphart’s (1999) executive-parties dimension. This (Lijphart’s first dimension) 
distinguishes political systems on the bases of the relative frequency of 
minimal winning one party cabinets, the effective number of parliamentary 
parties, the degree of executive dominance, the extent of electoral 
disproportionality, and the degree of interest group pluralism. The factor score 
has be transformed so that the value for the system with the most executive 
strength and least legislative strength is set to zero. 
iit LEGLCOG *  Interaction between legislative center of political gravity and the executive-parties dimension 
itEP  Electoral participation: Average percentage of electorate participating in elections during period. The data on this variable derives from the Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s web site <http://www.idea.int/> 
itWC  Kenworthy’s wage coordination index, period average. Date set available at <http://www.emory.edu/SOC/lkenworthy>. 
itDB  Demographic burden. Retired population and unemployed expressed as a percentage of total population, period average. Data based on information 
derived from various annual issues of the OECD’s Labour Force Statistics. 
itGEN  Generosity of welfare system. The ratio of government transfers to households as a percentage of GDP to DB, the demographic burden. Period 
average. Data can be found at <http://www.wz-berlin.de/mp/ism/staff/cusack 
_data_sets.en.htm#data> 
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Table 4 
Panel Estimation Results for Model Predicting 
Average Effective Tax Rate on Labor Income (5 year averages)  
 
 Mendoza 
AETRs 
OECD (1) 
AETRs 
OECD (2) 
AETRs 
    
Cabinet Center of 
Political Gravity 
1.50** 
(.72) 
1.80* 
(1.11) 
1.85* 
(1.07) 
Legislative Center 
of Political Gravity 
-5.11 
(3.85) 
-1.50 
(3.79) 
-3.18 
(3.96) 
Legislative 
Institutional 
Dominance 
-16.57*** 
(3.96) 
-21.71*** 
(4.50) 
-24.20*** 
(5.65) 
Legislative Center 
of Political Gravity * 
Legislative 
Institutional 
Dominance 
 
8.77*** 
(1.98) 
 
10.24*** 
(2.25) 
 
11.38*** 
(2.76) 
Wage Coordination 1.96*** 
(.42) 
3.33*** 
(.57) 
3.55*** 
(.64) 
Electoral 
Participation 
-.19*** 
(.04) 
-.24*** 
(.06) 
-.25*** 
(.05) 
Demographic 
Burden 
1.83*** 
(.14) 
1.75*** 
(.16) 
1.76*** 
(.15) 
Generosity of 
Welfare Programs 
.18*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.01) 
Constant .25 
(5.44) 
-1.97 
(5.33) 
.18 
(5.47) 
    
2R  .924 .850 .858 
Observations 
Countries 
Time units 
 
84 
14 
6 
84 
14 
6 
78 
13 
6 
LM Test: serial 
correlation, p-value 
.106 .040** .046** 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses 
Significance level: * < .10, ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Lagrange Multiplier test p-value below .05 rejects the absence of serial correlation at 
95% confidence interval 
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Table 5 
Panel a 
Labor AETR Under Unified Government 
Predicted Levels of AETR on Labor Income 
Given Partisan Situation and Institutional Context. 
 
 Weak 
Executive 
  Strong 
Executive 
 
 Left 
Cabinet-Left 
Parliament 
Right 
Cabinet-
Right 
Parliament 
 Left 
Cabinet-Left 
Parliament 
Right 
Cabinet-
Right 
Parliament 
Mendoza, et 
al 
38.9 27.3  32.4 30.8 
OECD 
version 1 
36.1 19.9  33.2 28.7 
OECD 
version 2 
37.9 22.2  34.6 31.0 
 
Partisan and institutional terms set at mean +/- 1 standard deviation. 
All other factors set to their mean values. 
 
 
Panel b 
Labor AETR Under Divided Government 
Predicted Levels of AETR on Labor Income 
Given Partisan Situation and Institutional Context 
 
 Weak 
Executive 
  Strong 
Executive 
 
 Left 
Cabinet-
Right 
Parliament 
Right 
Cabinet-Left 
Parliament 
 Left 
Cabinet-
Right 
Parliament 
Right 
Cabinet-Left 
Parliament 
Mendoza, et 
al 
29.2 37.0  32.7 30.5 
OECD 
version 1 
22.2 33.8  31.0 30.9 
OECD 
version 2 
24.6 35.5  33.4 32.2 
 
Partisan and institutional terms set at mean +/- 1 standard deviation. 
All other factors set to their mean values. 
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The situation of divided government is illustrated in the panel b of 
Table 5. On the left hand side we have a political configuration where the 
executive is weak (i.e., the legislature is the dominant institution) and the 
two institutions have different ideological orientations. The lack of unity in 
terms of ideological orientation does not seem to matter greatly. Once 
again, where the legislature is the dominant institution, the pronounced 
difference in policy outcome, given the different ideological orientations, 
comes through. And, again, it is muted in the situation described on the 
opposite side of the panel, where the executive is the dominant institution. 
 
In sum, then, partisanship works its effect on labor income tax 
policy. However, these partisan effects are either moderated or amplified 
by the institutional context within which political parties operate. Of 
particular importance are the relative strengths of the executive and 
legislature. Where the executive is more powerful, the force of 
partisanship is evident but very dampened. Such institutional settings are 
common to electoral systems based on majoritarian principles. These 
systems encourage moderation in policy since the leverage they give to 
the median voter facilitates the muting of partisan differences. This muting 
effect is absent in institutional settings where the legislature is the 
dominant branch. Such an institutional setting is found in systems 
regulated by electoral rules that promote proportionality. Here partisan 
effects are stark in manifesting themselves and here again we see that the 
left fosters much higher average effective tax rates on labor income than 
does the right. 
 
Ideological orientations of parties, the relative strength of 
governmental institutions, and the degree of wage coordination within the 
economy: what is it about this set of factors that brings them together to 
shape tax strategy on labor income? They are related not only in that they 
influence this strategy but also in that they are important features of 
Coordinated Market and Liberal Market Economies. 
 
Countries with higher levels of wage coordination, i.e., Coordinated 
Market Economies, are more likely to have left-wing governments and 
strong legislatures. Such a pattern speaks to the notion of institutional 
complementarities as reinforcing mechanisms for the differences between 
LMEs and CMEs. Two institutions are said to be complementary “if the 
presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) 
the other” (Hall and Soskice 2001:17). In particular, two types of 
complementarities are relevant to our concerns. 
 
The first of these complementarities is between economic and 
formal political institutions. The long-term functioning of wage coordination 
agreements requires risky investments by both workers and employers. As 
a result, the latter “cannot go down the route [of risky investments] unless 
they can be sure the government will sustain it” (Gourevitch and Haves 
2002: 245-247). 
 
Belief in a government’s commitment to existing policy is more 
likely in those political systems where actors have a better chance to 
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punish government if it deviates from that commitment. Hall and Soskice 
(2001) contend that systems based on proportional representation are 
better than majoritarian systems in providing actors with this monitoring 
and control capacity over government. In majoritarian systems a small 
shift in the distribution of votes theoretically could lead to a large shift in 
policy. In proportional representation systems, such changes are 
uncommon. There the legislature is stronger vis-à-vis the executive and 
coalition governments are more common. In such a context, parties 
defending the interests of specific economic actors have a better chance 
to punish the government if it deviates from previous policy. As a result, 
government commitments are more credible in proportional systems, and 
this facilitates the long-term functioning of economic institutions.  
 
Gourevitch and Haves (2002: 246) show that there is indeed a 
strong positive correlation between the economic institutions of CMEs and 
the presence of proportional representation (r=0.71) and coalition 
governments (r=0.72). Using the Lijphart data on legislative dominance 
and Hall and Gingerich’s index of overall coordination in the economy (see 
Figure 7), this point is reinforced. In sum, the presence of strong 
legislatures in CMEs facilitates the sustainability of wage coordination 
agreements and, in turn, the adoption of a particular taxation strategy. 
 
Figure 7 
Coordination and Legislative Dominance
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The second of these complementarities is to be found within the 
political realm, namely, that between the electoral system and the partisan 
composition of the government. As Iversen and Soskice (2002) have 
pointed out, the coexistence of strong legislatures and left-wing 
governments is no coincidence. They are both associated with electoral 
systems that use proportional representation. In proportional 
representation systems, middle class parties need to compromise with 
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other parties to govern. Iversen and Soskice (2002) show that it is in the 
interest of center parties to coalesce with the left because the type of 
redistribution policy provided by a center-left government would be closer 
to the center’s preferences than the redistribution policy that a center-right 
coalition would provide. As a result, countries with strong legislative 
institutions are more likely to have left-wing governments, which in turn 
reinforces a model of redistribution based on a large welfare state and 
high tax rates on labor.  
 
In conclusion, this section has highlighted the mechanisms that 
explain why CMEs tend to show higher tax rates on labor. They do so 
because they have higher levels of wage coordination, their governments 
are more likely to be oriented to the left, and their executives are relatively 
weak in relation to their legislatures. The question now remains as to the 
consequences of a strategy based on high taxes on labor for the 
performance of national economies. We turn to this issue in the final 
section of the paper. 
 
 
Tax Strategies and Labor Market Performance 
  
In practice, tax strategies are not economically neutral. They have 
consequences for the working of different markets and the economy in 
general. In this section we analyze whether or not and how the specific 
taxation strategies developed by CMEs affect the working of the economy. 
In order to do so, we concentrate on the relation between labor taxation 
and unemployment.  
 
Standard models in labor economics contend that strategies based 
on high levels of labor income taxation come at the price of increasing the 
levels of unemployment. This prediction is based on the analysis of the 
effects of labor income taxation on the supply and demand of labor. More 
specifically, these models point out three main causal mechanisms in this 
relation.  
 
First and foremost, higher taxes on labor income increase the price 
of labor and thereby reduce the demand for it. The effect of the increase in 
the price of labor depends on the extent to which employers bear the costs 
of higher levels of labor taxation. The operating mechanism through which 
higher taxes reduce labor demand is the adjustment of gross wages to 
labor tax increases. Higher taxes on labor are translated into higher gross 
wages in order to maintain workers´ real wages (Daveri and Tabellini 
2000: 57-62). As a result of this translation the price of labor increases and 
the demand for it declines.  
 
Second, labor taxes may affect unemployment through their 
interplay with labor supply decisions. “Textbook” models reveal two 
possible effects of labor taxes (Atkinson 1993: 20-50) on labor supply. The 
first is an income effect: taxes make people worse off by reducing their 
disposable income (in technical terms, the indifference curve between 
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work and leisure is shifted downwards). In these circumstances, the 
number of hours worked is increased in order to maintain the level of 
disposable income. The second effect is one of substitution: labor taxes 
increase the opportunity cost of work in terms of leisure (in technical 
terms, they create movements along the indifference curve between work 
and leisure). As a result, an increase in labor taxes leads people to reduce 
the number of hours they are willing to work. In principle, the income effect 
is likely to dominate in the bottom part of the distribution of earnings, 
working to increase labor supply. In the case of low-income earners, 
higher labor taxes would provoke, simultaneously, an increase in labor 
supply and a reduction in labor demand. The net result is an increase in 
the incidence of unemployment in this group.  
 
Finally, the interaction between labor taxes and transfers may add 
to unemployment through a different causal logic (Nickell and Layard 
1999; Disney 2000).  A lower number of working hours (at the extreme, 0) 
plus income transfers or subsidies may generate disposable income 
higher than that obtained by someone working more hours (and therefore 
being taxed more) and receiving less transfers or subsidies. Under these 
conditions, higher labor taxes will create incentives for some people to 
either enter into or remain within the state of unemployment (Joumard 
2001).  
 
As a result of these three mechanisms, higher rates of taxation on 
labor income are expected to generate higher levels of unemployment. 
Despite its compelling logic, the validity of this argument is open to an 
important qualification. A fundamental assumption in these models is that 
actors make their decisions in a world free of institutions. Yet, if such an 
assumption is relaxed, there are reasons to believe that the arrangements 
between capital and labor at work in CMEs shape the effects of labor 
taxes on the unemployment rate (Daveri and Tabellini 2000).  
 
This brings us back to the arrangements between capital and labor 
at work in CMEs. As argued above, CMEs are organized around a 
fundamental agreement between capital and labor.  Employers trade their 
acceptance of the development of a large public insurance system for a 
commitment from the unions to wage moderation. If, as a result of the 
incidence of labor taxes and the high levels of generosity, labor costs 
increased dramatically, the incentives of employers to coordinate with the 
unions would disappear. Thus, the capacity of unions to shift onto 
employers the cost of labor taxes via the adjustment of gross wages is 
heavily constrained in CMEs as opposed to LMEs.  As a result, in those 
economies with high levels of coordination(CMEs), the effects of labor 
taxes on labor demand and, ultimately, on the unemployment rate are 
expected to be muted. On the contrary, labor taxes are expected to have a 
larger incidence on unemployment in LMEs. 
 
In the following we set out to test the claim that the impact of labor 
taxes on the levels of unemployment is contingent upon the levels of 
coordination in the labor market. Our specification of the relation between 
taxes on labor and unemployment relates to previous contributions in 
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several respects. First, we do not assume the existence of a direct causal 
link between certain economic or political institutions and the 
unemployment rate.18 Rather, we contend that institutions such as wage 
coordination affect the way in which policy instruments (e.g., labor taxes) 
generate direct behavioral responses on the part of workers and 
employers. Second, we follow the approach of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) 
to capture the effects of interest, albeit using a different indicator of 
coordination. We interact two continuous variables, namely the average 
effective tax rates on labor and the index of wage bargaining coordination 
computed by Kenworthy. The coordination index has been rearranged to 
rank between 1 (maximum level of coordination) and 5 (minimum level of 
coordination) and multiplied thereafter by the average effective tax rates 
on labor. In this way, there is no need to introduce a constituent term for 
labor taxation in the specification: when there is no coordination, the 
coefficient of the interaction is capturing the impact of labor taxation on 
unemployment. Nor have we included a constituent term for wage 
coordination. The use of an independent term for wage coordination would 
require one to assume that some governments in our sample exempt labor 
from being taxed at all. This seems unreasonable. 
 
Before describing our estimates of the effects of labor tax rates on 
unemployment, let us deal with the other influences in the model. First, we 
control for the effects of inertia in the aggregate level of unemployment by 
including the lagged dependent variable. Second, a measure of aggregate 
world demand intended to control for changes in the economic situation of 
each country ´s major trading partners (Alt 1985) is included in the model. 
The intuition behind this variable is that if the major trading partners of a 
country experience economic downturns, this will reduce the demand for 
products from these countries, which in turn contracts labor demand and 
increases unemployment. Because of the way this variable is 
operationalized (see Table 6), we expect it to have a positive association 
with the unemployment rate. In addition, an indicator of the overall 
generosity of unemployment benefits (defined as the product of the level 
of benefits and their duration) is added to the model (see Table 6). This 
variable introduces a control for the behavioral responses that public 
transfers generate in the labor market. The logic underpinning this variable 
is that a more generous benefits system increases the reservation wage 
and makes the levels of unemployment higher and spells longer. Thus, a 
positive relation between the generosity index and the unemployment rate 
is expected. Finally, because of their alleged potential effects on labor 
demand (Scharpf 2000: 75-82), we also include as controls other 
significant elements of the tax system, namely the effective tax rates on 
consumption, capital, and corporate income. The relation between these 
variables has been specified using a panel regression equation using data 
on 13 OECD countries for five five-year periods. 
 
itititit BDBRRUU *211 ββα ++= − itWD3β+
itititititit CONTRCORTRKTRLWCLTR εγγγγ +++++ 4321 *  
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen; 1998,1999, 2000; Soskice and Iversen, 
2000; and Franzese 2002b. 
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Table 6 below provides the definitions for the variables in the 
equation. Estimation results using OLS with panel corrected standard 
errors (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996) are reported in Table 719.   As in the 
previous section, the equation has been estimated three times, once using 
the Mendoza tax rates and then with the two variants of the OECD rates.20  
 
The goodness of the fit is similar in all three equations. 
Substantively and statistically the results are very similar for the three 
versions of the labor tax rates. The exceptions deal with the impacts of the 
tax rates on capital and corporate income. Although capital tax rates show 
no statistically significant effects, the sign of the coefficient for this variable 
varies depending on the tax rates being used. In turn, corporate tax rates 
show very consistent and significant effects on the unemployment rate. In 
commenting on the other parameter estimates we will concentrate on 
those parameter values produced using the Mendoza series. 
 
Higher values on the world demand index, which signify declines in 
demand from major trading partners, are reflected in higher levels of 
unemployment. In addition, the effects of the overall generosity of 
unemployment benefits have the positive impact anticipated. Moreover, 
our findings are consistent with the claim that increasing the tax rate on 
corporations reduces labor demand and drives unemployment upwards. 
 
Finally the results support our claim that the unemployment 
consequences of labor taxes are contingent on the degree of wage 
bargaining coordination. By way of illustration, suppose that the tax rate on 
labor income increases by one standard deviation, which in our sample 
implies that taxes on labor increase by 10.5 percent. Using the estimates 
reported in the first column of Table 7, we can assess how such an 
increase affects the level of unemployment under different institutional 
conditions.  In those countries where there is no coordination between 
capital and labor (LWC=5), the unemployment rate will rise by 8.4 percent. 
If wage coordination were at a moderate level (LWC=3), the increase in 
the unemployment rate would be 5 percent. Finally, in those nations where 
the coordination between capital and labor is at its peak (LWC=1), a 10.5 
percent increase in labor tax rates will entail an increase of only 1.7 
percent in the unemployment rate. 
                                                 
19 The equation has also been estimated using as endogenous variables the OECD 
standardized unemployment rate (Nickell and Nunziata 2001) and the OECD time variant 
NAIRU estimates (Turner, et al (2001)). The results are similar to those reported in Table 
7.Our thanks to Peter Richardson for providing us with the NAIRU series. 
20 Note that missing data problems for one of the OECD variants reduced the number of 
countries to thirteen:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Table 6 
Variables in Models Predicting the Unemployment Rate 
Variable 
Label 
Variable definition. 
itU  Rate of unemployment. Data are based on national definitions drawn from various annual volumes of the OECD’s Labour 
Force Statistics.   
1−itU  Lagged level in the rate of unemployment in use. 
itLWC  
 
Lack of Wage Bargaining Coordination. It is a transformation 
(LoWC=6-WC) of Kenworthy’s wage coordination index (WC), 
period average.  
itBRR  Benefit Replacement Rate data provided by the OECD. The data refers to the first year of unemployment benefits, 
averaged over family types of recipients. The benefits are a 
percentage of average earnings before tax. See Nickell and 
Nunziata (2001) for details. 
itBD  Benefit Duration Index was developed by Wolfers (1999). The index is constructed in such a way that its value is 1 (if the 
benefit provision in the first year remains the same through the 
first four years) or between 0 and 1 (if otherwise). See Nickell 
and Nunziata (2001) for details. 
itWD  Alt’s world aggregate demand measure. Sum of weighted unemployment rates (U) in major trading partners. Weights are 
based on relative size of trading partners’ shares of exports (X) 
from country m.21 In addition to the thirteen countries 
mentioned in an earlier footnote, six other countries are 
included in these calculations; these are: Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, Norway, Portugal and Spain. 
itLTR  Average effective tax rate on labor income. Three variants from Mendoza, et al and the OECD. See Table 4 for sources. 
itKTR  Average effective tax rate on capital income. 
itCORTR  Average effective tax rate on corporate profits. 
itCONTR  Average effective tax rate on consumption. 
 
                                                 
21 The formula for James Alt’s (1985) World Demand index is : 
.,:,/ mjiwhereUXXW ijjiim ≠

 ∑∑=
 
Note that the trade data are derived from Kristian S. Gelditsch’s Expanded Trade and 
GDP Data Set, Version 2.1. This is available at 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/exptradegdp.html 
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Table 7  
Panel Estimation Results for Model Predicting 
the Unemployment Rate: National Definitions (5 year averages)  
 
AETR Definition: Mendoza OECD 1 OECD 2 
    
 
Lagged  
Unemployment Rate, National  
Definition 
 
 
.609*** 
(.126) 
 
.634*** 
(.116) 
 
 
.675*** 
(.113) 
AETR Labor * Lack of Wage Bargaining 
Coordination 
 
.016*** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.007) 
.013* 
(.007) 
 
Benefit Replacement Rate* Benefit Duration 
 
5.54*** 
(2.00) 
5.31*** 
(2.08) 
4.50** 
(1.97) 
 
Alt’s World Demand 
 
 
 
.206* 
(.114) 
 
.281** 
(.116) 
 
.207* 
(122) 
 
AETR Consumption 
 
 
-.036 
(.050) 
 
-.068 
(.076) 
 
-.029 
(.085) 
 
AETR Capital  
 
 
.003 
(.018) 
 
-.027 
(.021) 
 
.000 
(.019) 
 
AETR Corporate 
 
 
.028*** 
(.011) 
 
.023*** 
(.007) 
 
.018** 
(.009) 
 
Constant 
 
 
1.07 
(.728) 
 
-.142 
(.802) 
 
-.82 
(1.11) 
2R  .81 
 
.81 
 
.80 
 
Observations 
Countries 
Time units 
65 
13 
5 
65 
13 
5 
65 
13 
5 
LM test for serial correlation, p-value .389 .335 .279 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The paper has examined how the tax regimes across the OECD 
countries developed in the latter part of the 20th century. It has given 
particular emphasis to tax on labor income, which have become an 
important fiscal instrument. A number of results emerge from this 
examination. First, not only do labor income taxes represent a major drain 
on private households; they have become the mainstay of many of these 
countries’ public sector finances. 
 
Second, these taxes, and not taxes on capital, appear to be the 
preferred instrument of finance for those economic and political interests 
that advocate and support a strong (and thereby expensive) welfare state. 
We have been able to show that leftist parties, particularly in political 
systems where legislatures dominate the executive, push for higher taxes 
on labor with the apparent motive of helping to finance welfare spending. 
By pursuing this kind of tax strategy there is little “free lunch” to be had in 
these welfare states. What the working class receives, the working class 
pays for. Capital is little burdened by the welfare state and, indeed, in 
those economies that enjoy a high degree of coordination (particularly in 
terms of wage bargaining) one can say capital is being subsidized by 
affording it favorable labor market conditions (e.g., skilled labor that has 
strong incentives to remain loyal to employers and make moderate wage 
demands).  
 
Third, the effort at financing the welfare state this way comes at a 
cost in terms of lost employment opportunities. However, the magnitude of 
this loss is itself a function of the institutional conditions in the labor 
market. The recent results presented by Peter Lindert (2003) on the kind 
of taxation strategy we have described here suggest that there are 
beneficial qualities to such a strategy, at least in terms of overall economic 
growth. In addition, our results suggest that wherever labor and capital are 
able to coordinate, the employment costs of taxing work are significantly 
reduced. 
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